United States foreign policy Establishment. Armstrong's career as editor and Council official is enlightening as to the manner in which the supposedly private and nongovernmental Council was instrumental in developing the foreign policy of the United States between the wars and even more during and after the Second World War. Rarely in the public eye, during his long life Armstrong nonetheless unobtrusively participated in an impressive number of key moments in the formulation of official United States foreign policy. For decades he habitually travelled abroad for several months of the year, meeting the political and intellectual elite of numerous countries and keeping detailed diary-notes of his experiences, as he usually did of those many other significant occasions when he was at least an interested bystander and often much more. A Democrat who worked easily with numerous Republicans, he had the knack of being present when key decisions were under consideration. His career in many ways epitomized the style and outlook of the elite which to a large degree took such decisions.$ Armstrong's real introduction to American politics came in  as a freshman at Princeton, when the University's former president, Woodrow Wilson, ran a successful campaign as the Democratic candidate for President of the United States. Although still too young to vote, Armstrong supported Wilson, whose inspiration would to a considerable degree inform the remainder of his career, and marched exuberantly in the President-elect's victory parade. Even at this time Armstrong displayed a precocious interest in international affairs. In spring  he planned to help organize a ''conference of college men at Washington … to promote World peace. ''% At Princeton he arranged meetings featuring a variety of speakers of all nationalities. As a youthful undergraduate editor of the Daily Princetonian, in February  Armstrong publicly though unsuccessfully opposed the pro-Allied Princeton president John Grier Hibben's proposal to introduce military training as a credit-bearing course for undergraduates, and his letter on the subject was reprinted in the New York Evening Post and discussed in other leading publications.& While the continuing League fight in the United States Senate.* Armstrong, who had since his Princeton days been attracted to the world of journalism, joined the staff of the New York Evening Post, a newspaper which had just been bought by the pro-League of Nations Thomas W. Lamont, a partner in the famous banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Company and an economic adviser to Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Peace Conference. The new proprietor, a former journalist who liquidated his enticing but expensive investment a few years later, was at this time ''determined to restore it as a voice of liberal conservatism. ''"! The paper took a firmly pro-League stance, and the apprentice Armstrong found himself reporting on a wide variety of topics, both foreign and domestic. Perhaps even more important, his position gave him the opportunity to meet numerous prominent international figures, such as Lord Bryce, the former British Ambassador to the United States, and the South African leader General Jan Christian Smuts. "" In March  Armstrong, then visiting Europe for his wife's health, was offered the position of assistant or managing editor of the quarterly journal, Foreign Affairs, which the newly created Council on Foreign Relations wished to establish. In the most crucial decision of his career, he accepted the job and proceeded to spend the next several months travelling around Europe, observing the political scene and persuading prominent European figures to contribute to the new periodical. Initially the managing editor of Foreign Affairs, Armstrong soon assumed increased responsibility for it as the health of Archibald Cary Coolidge, the Harvard professor of history who had been one of the American experts at Paris and who served as chief editor, deteriorated during the s."# When Coolidge died in  Armstrong took over his position, having already acquired additional and much-needed help with his more general duties on the Council when Walter T. Mallory took over from him as executive director in . Even before Mallory took this position, Armstrong had initiated an extensive programme of dinner talks, discussion meetings, and study groups, and he continued to be heavily involved in setting the Council's agenda. Many years later Mallory, on his retirement, would tell 
Armstrong quite simply : ' [T]he Council has been your creation. ''"$ In
Foreign Affairs, his influence was paramount. ''The chief function of the [Foreign Affairs advisory] board in my experience, '' one member said upon his retirement, ''has been to admire Ham. '' Another added that ''none of us was under the illusion that we were anything but a group of people Ham likes to talk to. ' '"% In  the Council on Foreign Relations was still a fledgling organization, not the imposing and prestigious body it would later become. Much of its later success would indeed be the fruit of the effort that the young and enthusiastic Armstrong devoted not only to its publications but to building up the parent institution, an endeavour which was to be his life's work. When accepting the position of editor, Armstrong recalled, ''I did not know that I also would take over running the Council on Foreign Relations, which meant seeing to its financing, membership and meetings. ''"& In early  the Council was in serious difficulties. It represented two separate organizations which had merged in . One, the original Council on Foreign Relations, ''a group organized in  by leading lawyers, bankers and other men of affairs in New York to discuss wartime problems and entertain foreign visitors '', was by mid- ''languishing '' and ''old and waning. '' The second, more academic in its emphasis, was the American Institute of International Affairs, one of two ''separate but associated '' organizations, the other being the British Royal Institute of International Affairs, founded by the respective American and British experts who came together at the Paris Peace Conference. The two American organizations amalgamated in early , appointing a prominent and well-connected board of directors, carefully setting fees that academics as well as businessmen could afford, and launching a successful fundraising drive targeted at those in the New York financial community -Lamont, for instance, and the GermanJewish banker Otto H. Kahn -who had shown strong support for an enhanced United States international role."' Ironically, in  Armstrong opposed the merger of the two organizations, writing to his friend Whitney Shepardson :
You ask my views on the proposal to discontinue the Institute, in view of the fact that the Council on Foreign Relations is planning to enlarge its membership and expand its activities. It does not appear to me that this fact has any bearing on the policy of the Institute. The Council on Foreign Relations will merely become more unwieldy, more conservative, more generally useless, if it takes in a large number of new members on top of its present assortment. My understanding of the Institute was that it planned to secure a small membership among men interested in day by day developments of international affairs, and acquainted to some measure with conditions existing in certain foreign countries. I thought that such a group, consisting of younger men and older and more experienced men alike, had a very useful function to perform, and that one of its advantages would be that, being a small group, it could not embark on the usual round of publishing useless bulletins and calling dull dinners to listen to the stereotyped speeches of professional publicists. I do not say that this is what the Council on Foreign Relations is going to do. I only say that I don't see how it can fail to do that, given its present organization and membership. The fact that it is on a ''sound financial basis '' seems to me like a distinct disadvantage. Most of the members of it are on a far too ''sound financial basis '' to care much about any facts in conflict with their usual outlook. This sounds like an unbalanced statement. I know many of the members of the Council, respect them heartily, and consider that it is a great honor to meet them and talk to them. But I think they represent one set of ideas, the ideas of New York business men, very prosperous ones, and I don't see how the aims of the Institute can be carried out under their auspices. If the majority of the members of the Institute think it wise to discontinue the organization of course there is nothing further to say, and I, as a recently elected member, shall accept the decision as final. But if the matter is still pending, as I understand it is, I should consider it my duty to vote emphatically against the proposal. This, as you will have gathered, is what I am doing by this long letter !"( Now Armstrong had the opportunity to avoid these pitfalls and create a unique role for the outcome of this shotgun marriage between the intellectual and business worlds. He was an editor who had a vision of what Foreign Affairs could be and rarely faltered in its pursuit. From the beginning the emphasis was on the influential rather than simple mass appeal : early speakers included Georges Cle! menceau, the French President, E ! douard Herriot, the French Premier, J. Ramsay MacDonald, the British Prime Minister, his compatriot Lord Robert Cecil, and similar luminaries. Most were given the opportunity to speak confidentially off the record, though particularly prestigious addresses were sometimes open to the general public. Likewise, the editors deliberately solicited articles not only from political and academic commentators but from leading statesmen, financiers, and economists : just a few examples of the early contributors include V. I. Lenin, Hjalmar Schacht, Heinrich Bru$ ning, Raymond Poincare! , Leon Trotsky, and Thomas W. Lamont, all writing on issues then much in the news which they themselves were in a position to affect. It quickly became a tradition that before each presidential election representatives of the major political parties should publish pieces on their party's foreign policy achievements and outlook, and that Secretaries of State should give at least one address before the Council. ''Our circulation is not large (only ,), '' Armstrong rather smugly told President Franklin D. Roosevelt in , ''but as you know, it includes the most influential people all over the country, as well as many key people in foreign governments. ''") The Council sponsored study groups which considered such topical issues as Anglo-American relations, disarmament policy, Latin American affairs, Far Eastern affairs, economics, and raw materials policy, groups which generally attracted at least some participants from the Department of State. The organization's emphasis and activities in turn succeeded in winning it further memberships and financial support from the influential internationalist New York business community, always the Council's economic mainstay, and from the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation."* Armstrong's duties were not so onerous as to prevent him from travelling extensively in Europe between the wars, and many of the most interesting entries in his diaries relate to these itineraries. To give only one example, in  he visited Soviet Russia, where he had lengthy talks with Maxim Litvinov, the Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which the latter suggested that the Soviet Union expected little from either American presidential candidate that year.#! As editor of Foreign Affairs, Armstrong not only solicited articles from leading American and foreign figures, he also had the entre! e into top American political circles. His diaries for the early s contain numerous entries relating to the international financial crisis, the Manchurian crisis, and disarmament negotiations, and he was in the confidence of leading American which his brother John Foster was a leading partner, but whose first love remained international affairs. Allen quickly became a strong supporter of the Council, becoming a director in  and serving on several of its study groups.#& From  onwards the two men, along with other leading lights of the Council such as Henry L. Stimson, increasingly sounded the then highly unfashionable rallying cry of the need to resist the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. Armstrong in particular was much affected by an interview with Hitler a month after the latter came to power, which convinced him that war was likely in Europe.#' Both men were alarmed by the deteriorating European situation. They united in deploring in particular the American congressional and popular response, from  onwards, of passing neutrality legislation specifically designed to prevent the United States being drawn into another war through disputes over trade with belligerents or the rights of Americans to travel on belligerent ships or in war zones. The two men co-authored two books opposing the neutrality legislation, publications which developed out of a Council study group and were sponsored by the Council : the first, Can We Be Neutral ? (), suggested modifications to the legislation and active American involvement in world affairs with the aim of maintaining peace ; the second, Can America Stay Neutral ? (), suggested that American disengagement from the coming European war was an unrealistic hope.#( Armstrong also favoured amending the Neutrality Acts to allow the President to determine whether or not to invoke any or all of their provisions when he declared that a state of war existed, a move which would have given the President great discretion as to the degree to which the United States leaned to one side or the other in response to any foreign war.#) Simultaneously Armstrong alone also produced several books on contemporary European affairs and America's relationship to these, works which suggested that fascism and democracy could not coexist and that the United States could not ultimately remain unaffected by developments in Europe. produced '' to be carried in the journal's June issue.$$ Shortly afterwards he commissioned a series of articles from assorted authors ''on education, religion, law, labor, etc., as they have been affected by the spirit, program and decrees of the present German regime, '' arguing that ''if we are to resist effectively the spread of Nazi doctrine to other countries, and mitigate or limit the results of the application of those doctrines within Germany itself, we must deal with the elements of the problem individually and in a detailed way, so as to bring home to those who are interested in some particular field of activity the destructive results of Nazi practice in that specific field. ''$% Yet another kindred spirit was diplomat George S. Messersmith, an early opponent of Hitler and Nazism whose views the Roosevelt administration largely ignored until the late s.$& In so far as he could, Armstrong endeavoured to persuade Franklin D. Roosevelt to endorse his views and deter the growing power of the European dictators. Throughout the s the two men, fellow Democrats, were associated as officers of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, organized to promote the ideals of the late president, and Armstrong would indeed remain active on this body until at least the s.$' In  Armstrong, a longtime supporter of a strong League of Nations, was repelled by Roosevelt's politically motivated decision to repudiate the League, of which the latter man had previously been a strong supporter, and preferred the candidacy of the more dependably Wilsonian Newton D. Baker.$( The election over, however, he moved to ingratiate himself with the new president, on whose policies he hoped to exercise some influence. In June , back from six weeks in Central Europe, Armstrong offered to give Roosevelt the benefit of his experiences ; although on this occasion the President declined his offer, a year later he was more successful in making a presidential appointment upon his return from several weeks in Germany, Austria, and the Balkans, perhaps because he asked for Roosevelt's guidance before he wrote several articles and a short book.$) On this occasion, Armstrong told his equally anti-German friend George Messersmith : ''The point I particularly wanted to make to him is that we should not finance American exports to Germany. I gave him all the reasons, financial, political and moral, and you will be interested to know that he expressed himself in agreement with my conclusions. ''$* Despite Armstrong's optimism, Roosevelt does not appear to have taken any action at this time on his suggestions. When the book appeared, Armstrong sent Roosevelt a copy, for which he received a warm note of appreciation.%! Similar affable though perhaps to Armstrong somewhat unsatisfactory contacts continued throughout the decade.%" In , in response to Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, Armstrong tried again to persuade Roosevelt and the Department of State to block the extension of private American credits to Italy.%# As the President slowly moved closer to Armstrong's position, relations between the two men warmed still further. Armstrong congratulated Roosevelt on the quarantine speech of October , when the President suggested the use of economic sanctions against aggressor nations.%$ In April  he responded instantly when Roosevelt offered him a position on the newly established President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, a transnational body charged with facilitating the escape of refugees from war-torn Europe. Particularly after war broke out in , Armstrong personally made every effort to rescue as many such persons as possible, spending several months in Europe using all his numerous influential international contacts in this enterprise.%% He did not hesitate to ask Roosevelt himself for special authority and visa clearances for European intellectuals and others in danger of German internment and execution. Armstrong's energetic action in this crisis was only heightened by the fact that many of those most in need of rescue were personal friends whom he had come to know during his extensive travels of the previous two decades.%& Armstrong advocated a far more strenuous American response to the European situation than the simple rescue of displaced persons and those politically at odds with the fascist regimes. By early  he confessed himself disappointed by what he saw as Roosevelt's failure to make ''the very best possible use, strategically speaking, of the opportunities which he had a few weeks ago to define and popularize the American policy which to my mind would best serve ultimate American interests. ''%' By November , however, Armstrong was a dedicated Roosevelt supporter, won over by the President's increasing tilt towards the Allies.%( Armstrong was one of those most determined to push the President in this direction. He was a founding member of the Century Group, interventionists who often met at the Century Club and who eventually formed the ultra-pro-Allied organization Fight for Freedom ; the Century Group's most energetic organizer, Francis Pickens Miller, was also a Council employee on temporary leave of absence. Whereas the more moderate Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies argued that such assistance was the best means of keeping the United States out of the war, the Century Group hoped that their country would join Great Britain outright in the war against Hitler. They publicly urged Roosevelt to introduce conscription, build up American defences, and give all assistance possible to Britain, even at the risk of war with Germany, arguing that American national security and Britain's fate could not be separated.
In particular, in autumn  they spearheaded a public campaign urging the President to conclude the ''Destroyers-for-Bases '' deal with Britain ; and in  strongly urged that the United States Navy escort convoys of merchantmen bound for Britain, even at the risk of war, and also advocated that the United States should include Greenland in its defensive perimeter, a policy the Roosevelt administration adopted.%)
Even before the United States entered the war, the Council on Foreign Relations, in collaboration with the Department of State, had begun to plan for the post-war world, one essential feature of which in their view would be that the United States would play a much larger role than had hitherto been the case. Here again Armstrong was instrumental in setting Armstrong's decision to devote himself full-time again to the Council and Foreign Affairs perhaps put him in an even better position to influence the future of Europe and the development of the Cold War. From  onwards the Council set up numerous study and discussion groups to come up with recommendations on United States policy on international issues, groups whose members included such leading officials as the banker Frank Altschul, George F. Kennan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allen W. Dulles, Dean Acheson, and John J. McCloy. Among the topics covered in the seven or eight years after the war were Aid to Europe, American-Russian Relations, Europe's Economic and Political Reconstruction, Economic Aspects of American Foreign Policy, and the United Nations, while one prestigious group spent the three years  to  simply discussing ''American Foreign Policy. '' These groups served the purpose of helping to hammer out an elite consensus on foreign policy, providing a confidential forum in which those ''in-and-outers '' who shuttled between government service and the worlds of business, banking and law, academics, and government officials could, in modern parlance, '' brainstorm, '' floating potential courses of action before an informed and discreet audience. Their meetings helped to develop the initiatives which would bear fruit in the Marshall Plan, the regeneration of Germany, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, American rearmament, and United States support for European economic union.&& Besides attending and participating in many of these groups ' meetings, Armstrong made his own modest effort to influence public opinion at this time by publishing The Calculated Risk (), a book which not only argued in favour of the newly announced Marshall Plan, but also called for the modification of the United Nations charter to allow nations which so desired to sign a separate protocol under which they bound themselves to come to the aid of any nation attacked in contravention of any international treaty. This provision was intended to circumvent the veto power on any United Nations action which its Charter gave to all the five permanent Security Council members, including the Soviet Union.&' In addition, Armstrong played some role -just how significant is difficult to assess -in shaping the views of the influential Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when the Second World War ended, and that body's chairman in the crucial period  to . colleagues in negotiating the United Nations Charter at San Francisco, and Armstrong helped to persuade his erstwhile associate to support the Marshall Plan, the creation of first the Western European Union and then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and finally the commitment of American military resources to NATO.&( Armstrong initially seems to have hoped for the continuation of Soviet-American wartime co-operation. In January  he professed himself shocked by a proposal from George Brett, the head of Macmillans, that he edit ''a symposium … attacking the concept of collaboration with Soviet Russia, '' even though he admitted : ''We all have reservations about the possibility of collaboration, and I think we ought to re-assess our position constantly. ''&) Within eighteen months, however, in the July  issue of Foreign Affairs, Armstrong published what was almost certainly the most influential article ever to appear in the journal's pages, the piece by Kennan (identified only as Mr. ''X, '' undoubtedly a remarkably thin disguise to most of those already moving in American decision-making circles) entitled ''The Sources of Soviet Conduct. '' This piece, drawing on memoranda and telegrams Kennan had already circulated around the Department of State, publicly stated the strategic doctrine of ''containment '' which would become the guiding principle of United-States foreign policy for the next four decades.&* In  he followed this with another piece on Russia by a State Department official, published under the pseudonym ''Historicus, '' a memorandum by George A. Morgan of the Division of Eastern European Affairs on the topic ''Stalin on Revolution, '' drawing attention to Stalin's recent public reespousal of encouragement of international Communist revolution.'! These were only two of the many articles by officials, American and others, among them Henry L. Stimson, John J. McCloy, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Acheson, which essentially prepared public opinion to accept the evolving Cold War policies. Just as before World War II Foreign Affairs ' pages had been particularly readily available to those who condemned American neutrality and urged the United States to take a more interventionist line in checking dictatorships, so after the war those who favoured an activist United States policy towards Europe could count on a friendly reception from the journal's editor. The immediate post-war years were probably the period of Armstrong's greatest direct influence upon United States foreign policy ; despite painful back problems, the s were perhaps his golden age. Buoyed by an extremely happy remarriage to a younger woman of British and German extraction, he unobtrusively assumed the mantle of elder statesman. The Armstrongs travelled extensively on all continents, a habit he would continue until his death, interviewing international notables as one of themselves and with considerable aplomb extracting articles from distinguished but often reluctant authors. Foreign Affairs also provided a forum for rising young academic and government stars, the most celebrated of whom was perhaps Henry Kissinger, who not only contributed numerous articles to the journal, using it as a springboard to launch his career, but also authored a bestselling Council study on nuclear weapons.'" Armstrong was a frequent star speaker in courses run by the National War College, the State Department, and other government agencies. As always, he participated energetically in Council discussion and study groups, attracted speakers, and also helped to orchestrate fundraising initiatives to tap the resources of both its wealthy individual and corporate supporters and the large foundations which had become so central to the finances of think-tanks such as the Council on Foreign Relations.'# In the late s he also had a discernible impact on his country's foreign-aid programme. After a lengthy tour of the Middle East, undertaken at the request of the Senate, in February  he submitted reports which recommended the ''separati[on of ] economic from military aid appropriations '' and ''two specific and I think original suggestions, one … to set up a Foreign Education Aid Fund, the other … to create mechanisms to provide credit facilities for small businessmen and farmers. '''$ His report was well received by both Congress and the State Department, and correspondence between Armstrong and Fulbright suggests that it helped to strengthen the still young and struggling Fulbright Program of international educational exchanges of scholars and students.'% Armstrong remained at the helm of Foreign Affairs until , when in valediction he published the journal's fiftieth anniversary issue. His final years with the Council were shadowed by his growing discomfort over both the Vietnam War itself and the manner in which it devastated the Council's gentlemanly tradition of civility in disagreement, and also by a pronounced distaste for the changes initiated by its Chairman, David Rockefeller, Cyrus R. Vance, and its new President, Bayless Manning, appointed the Council's first full-time managing director in . The function of the Council was changing and its influence was being challenged by other institutions and by the fact that a New York elite no longer dominated the United States to the same degree ; in  one of its fellows wrote :
It is questionable … whether the CFR should consciously strive, as it may have during the s, s and s, to be a consensus-builder and transmitter of that consensus to the governmental policy process. Distilling the issues and clarifying policy alternatives for the United States should be its goal.'& Armstrong undoubtedly agreed with the plaint of his old associate, Walter Mallory, now retired : ''The organization more and more assumes the character of the [far less exclusive and influential] Foreign Policy Association. '''' The age of the common man and the new sixties ' disrespect for convention and good form could not but repel the Council's conservatively mannered founding elders. They, in turn, were often depicted as outdated and stuffy. In  a group of younger academics and journalists, most with some Harvard connection, founded Foreign Policy, a rival journal whose editors suggested that Foreign Affairs was ''unbelievably pompous, sleepy, and filled with articles ghost-written by the heads of many states. '''( Attempting to change this image, Manning initiated moves designed to broaden its member base geographically and socially, for the first time admitting women and consciously attempting to increase the numbers of black and younger members.') Armstrong was particularly distressed by Armstrong Acheson's son-in-law, would replace him in the near future, when he left Foreign Affairs after completing his fifty years as editor. Armstrong had known Bundy and his family for many years and loyally welcomed the appointment, telling his successor in ''one of the most rewarding jobs in the world '' that the choice gave him the ''greatest possible satisfaction, '' and offering to help in any way possible but to refrain from any interference.(" A substantial minority of Council members, led by the Princeton academics Richard Falk and Richard Ullman, were less enthusiastic, arguing that Bundy, whom they believed was greatly to blame for American involvement in Vietnam, was an inappropriate candidate who would be unable to exercise sufficient objectivity to be an unbiased editor. They launched a well-publicized though unsuccessful attempt to rescind the appointment, a move which greatly distressed Armstrong, who believed that Bundy's policies, though possibly mistaken, had been undertaken in good faith and that ''he and the others who made Vietnam policy had done their duty as they saw it at the time. ''(# Armstrong was particularly disturbed by the contingent personal attacks on Bundy, some of which bluntly stated that he was a criminal who should stand trial for war atrocities, which to Armstrong were a total negation of the principle of courteous if sometimes heated respect for differing viewpoints which in his view had always characterized the Council.($ Like other quondam critics of Bundy's policies, George Ball for example, Armstrong responded indirectly by sponsoring Bundy's membership in the exclusive Century Association, citing his ''really distinguished career in government '' and the fact that his nominee was ''in every respect a cultivated and humane and likeable individual. ''(% The Vietnam War itself, however, was a subject on which Armstrong came to have the gravest of reservations. As early as May  he told a high Council official that he had ''lost a great deal of [his] respect for [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk in the last months '' and that he believed that President Johnson's ''handling of foreign affairs has been crude and impulsive. ''(& A few months later he suggested to Arthur H. Dean, a leading New York lawyer and a long-time Director of the Council, that to take out a large public advertisement in the New York Times supporting administration policy on Vietnam might suggest ''desperation '' in the White House, and, when Dean did so regardless, Armstrong refused to sign it.(' He gently reproved a Yugoslav academic friend who participated in a mock trial, organized by Bertrand Russell, of Johnson and his Cabinet officials for war crimes, on the grounds that this might actually hamper those Americans who wished ''to bring the Viet Nam war to an end, '' which Armstrong declared to be his ''only concern. ''(( In  he refused to sign another manifesto drafted by Paul Douglas, in this case one supporting all efforts to bring about peace, praising its ''excellent objectives '' but explaining that ''over forty years as editor of a nonpartisan periodical, I 've refrained from adding my signature to any sort of manifesto no matter how laudable. ''() By  Armstrong was alarmed by the possibility that American and Vietnamese troops might expand the war from South Vietnam into neighbouring Cambodia, and wrote to McGeorge Bundy, the former National Security Adviser, expressing his misgivings. He was particularly -and rightly -concerned that the introduction of South Vietnamese troops into Cambodia, a hereditary enemy, might lead the latter country's ruler, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, to seek aid from the People's Republic of China, thereby enlarging the war and probably bringing about ultimate Communist domination of Cambodia. Armstrong urged that the United States should therefore respect Cambodia's neutrality.(* For years the Council was riven by divisions over Vietnam, which transformed its previous atmosphere of slightly rarefied disagreements into one characterized by bitter personal attacks and discord. Between  and  the issue of Vietnam was so sensitive that no study group even attempted to tackle it. It was the elderly Armstrong who courageously broke the Council's silence in spring , just after the crucial Tet offensive, by devoting large portions of three successive issues of Foreign Affairs to the war. These included articles giving varying perspectives on the conflict. In the first such issue Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs under Kennedy and Johnson, argued that the United States faced a choice between further escalation of the war and gradual withdrawal ; he urged the latter course. Sir Robert Thompson, a British specialist on guerrilla warfare, suggested that the war could be won but this would be a long, slow process. Chester L. Cooper, a former National Security Council Assistant for Asian Affairs, suggested that a negotiated peace was a possibility, though achieving it would be difficult.)! Despite misgivings from the Council's chairman, John J. McCloy, who attempted to dissuade him by the argument that his views would be taken as an official statement of the Council's position, Armstrong also included a contribution from himself which, as he told President Johnson's liberal aide Bill Moyers : ''I found I could not help writing. '' He even told McCloy : ''By and large, most of the articles we have printed in   over the years have tended to support Washington. … [I]t doesn't seem to me detrimental to   to indicate once in a while that we really are an independent organ of opinion. '')" He warned that Americans ''must reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is not a final solution to the war there '' and that the United States would be unable to attain anything it could define as victory. He urged negotiations with the Viet Cong, expressed great unease with aspects of the Thieu regime, and suggested that the United States must insist that South Vietnam's government institute genuine political and land reforms and force the Thieu Government to broaden its base by including representatives of other political parties. He hoped that part or all of Vietnam might eventually be neutralized, the guarantors of such a settlement to be the United States, other Asian governments, and perhaps even the Soviet Union. He stated firmly :
[O]ur country cannot in conscience or good sense continue sacrificing lives -our own, those of our friends and those of our enemies -in an enterprise which was designed to help a people to freedom and prosperity but which instead is destroying them. Circumstances have changed and our policies must change to accord with them. We can assert with proper pride that our motives in first intervening in Viet Nam were of the best, and without humiliation that, in spite of greater efforts and painful sacrifices, our calculations -or lack of themsomewhere along the way misled us.)# In his remaining years as editor Armstrong continued to publish extensively on Vietnam, as well as urging the Council to undertake a study of the reasons of American intervention in the region.)$ Armstrong's choice of authors, whatever attempts he made to be impartial, undoubtedly reflected a strong sense that American involvement in the war was mistaken and must be brought to an end. The following issue carried articles by the political scientists Herman Kahn and Samuel P. Huntington on potential negotiated settlements, and by Bill Moyers, a former aide to President Johnson, on the American tradition of political dissent as demonstrated over Vietnam.)% Early in  the incoming National Security Adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, a former Council research fellow, wrote on the ongoing Paris peace negotiations, while later in the year the journal published an account by Clark Clifford, the outgoing Secretary of Defense and a well-known dove, as to the evolution of his views on Vietnam.)& William P. Bundy, trimming to the prevailing winds, suggested that the balance of power in Asia was changing, due to China's Cultural Revolution and other factors, and that the rationale for American involvement in Southeast Asia had been greatly modified if it had not disappeared completely.)' Early in  Armstrong published a piece by the well-known journalist Harrison Salisbury, who in  was the first American newspaperman to report from the North, which warned any remaining optimistic Americans that, after fighting bitterly for several decades against the French and the Americans, the North Vietnamese were unlikely to accept any settlement which failed to tilt the military balance in their favour.)( For the next issue Armstrong solicited an article from Matthew Ridgway, commander of the United States troops during the Korean War, in which the old general suggested that the United States use whatever means necessary to extricate itself from Vietnam.))
Unlike some Establishment critics of Vietnam, such as George Ball and Walter Lippmann, who regarded the war primarily as a strategic mistake on the part of the United States, Armstrong, still at heart a Wilsonian, was genuinely horrified by the savagery with which Americans waged the war, behaviour which he regarded as a betrayal of his country's ideals. In uneasy about not being given any rationale or explanation. ''*! Yet, somewhat ironically, the Council found itself the target of demonstrations by protesters demanding that it condemn the war and United States bombing in Indochina and use its influence to bring about withdrawal. *" Armstrong's swansong was his valedictory article ''Isolated America, '' published in the fiftieth-anniversary issue of Foreign Affairs, the last he edited before handing over to William P. Bundy. In it he looked back over its half-century to declare : ''Not since we withdrew into comfortable isolation in  has the prestige of the United States stood so low, '' he stated. ''The risk today is not that the American people may become isolationist ; the reality is that the United States is being isolated. '' The Vietnam War, he warned, ''the longest and in some respects the most calamitous war in our history, '' had ''rent the American people apart, spiritually and politically. It is a war which has not been and could not be won, a war which was pushed from small beginnings to an appalling multitude of horrors. … The methods we have used have scandalized and disgusted public opinion in almost all foreign countries. '' Other foreign policy initiatives -the imposition of an import surcharge, visits to Moscow and Peking -were in themselves admirable, providing that ''the endeavor did not involve sacrificing friendships and alliances with people with whom we had close ties. '' The proviso was not heeded and some American allies, notably Canada, Japan, and India, felt badly treated. As a result, ''American principles, which sometimes were characterized as naive but in general were respected as sincere and humane, now are freely called hypocritical and self-serving. … The rhetoric of good works and high ideals is everywhere heard … but the words used to express the highest aspirations have become shopworn. '' Armstrong did not, however, despair. He called upon the United States to regain its former high standing in the world ''by rehumanizing ourselves, by readopting civility as part of good behavior, by recognizing that history can inform the future, by encouraging the growth of elites in many fields, not in order to copy them snobbishly but to set standards to which everyone may in some degree aspire, by asserting that aesthetics is an essential element in art, by reestablishing learning as opening doors to choice, by leavening the mediocrity of our culture with snatches of unorthodoxy, by welcoming diversity of opinion as an essential element of strength in a democracy.*# Are there limits to our national needs for influence in the world, and what are they ? … . Personally, I 've always maintained that our interests are world-wide but that we should be chary about assuming that we can secure those which lie outside the scope of our material power. The protection and promotion of those interests so far as possible, I thought, was the task of diplomacy.
We are now engaged on the mainland of Asia, we have troops and nuclear weapons in Europe, we are assumed by Latin Americans to be responsible for their prosperity or the reverse, and the list could be extended ? Does this mean there no longer are limits ?
Perhaps there are not. Or perhaps enough thought has not been given to whether or not the assumptions that led us into the Marshall Plan (with such successful results) give us valid reason to assume that we can deal with new farflung problems with equal success.*$ Nonetheless, one can discern certain principles which informed his entire career, and through it the policy of Foreign Affairs and the Council on Foreign Relations. I have argued elsewhere that there exist two traditions in twentieth-century United States foreign policy. One, which can be traced back to Theodore Roosevelt, emphasizes that diplomacy needs to be based upon military force, stresses the need for an AngloAmerican or Atlantic alliance, tends to rely upon great-power negotiations, and calls for the maintenance of a balance of power favourable to the United States. The other, which may be called Wilsonian, after its founder, is far more universalist in outlook, emphasizing the rights of all nations, large and small, and the need to base policy upon moral, idealistic and righteous principles.*% To a considerable degree, Armstrong's outlook represented a fusion of these two strands.
Armstrong himself always remained faithful to the man who was his youthful political idol. During the First World War he spoke disparagingly of the views of those, such as Roosevelt and his associate General Leonard Wood, who called for military preparedness and universal military training, and was associated with the pacifist Oswald Garrison Villard.*& Then and later admiration for Theodore Roosevelt was conspicuously absent from his writings, while, as we have seen, he showed continuing policies under which the United States pledged itself to resist the spread of Soviet influence in Europe immediately after the Second World War and his desire to make it easier for the United Nations to take military action in support of its declared policies.
Yet underlying these positions was a strong moralism. Indeed, Armstrong's early espousal of anti-Fascist American policies seems to have been due not so much to considerations of the national interest and the maintenance of a favourable European balance of power as to his almost instinctive revulsion from Hitler and all his methods, which affected him immediately he had met the Fu$ hrer and never changed. He deprecated limited plans for an Anglo-American alliance, much preferring a broader universalist approach, and in  stated :
I am worried by the plans to reach the goal through regional Councils which seem to me to offer too easy a way of escape for American isolationists who will espouse the idea of an American Council and say that the British and Russians, for example, must handle the problems of a council of Europe. I am also worried by the talk about alliances, specifically an Anglo-American alliance, even though the ultimate goal is a world organization. My reasons for this are principally two : I don't think we will get an Anglo-American alliance as a matter of practical politics ; and I think it matters a good deal to other nations -e.g Russia, France, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, etc. -whether we try to implement a general undertaking by specific understandings with Britain and other powerful nations or whether we start with an alliance that leaves them out and then invite them in."!"
Armstrong was always somewhat uncomfortable with undiluted realpolitik. In  he told a historian friend : ''I think Churchill's and Stalin's division of Eastern and Southern Europe into spheres of influence, in percentages, not only showed Churchill extremely naive but marked a moral lapse that has weakened our ability to stand up to Communism in Eastern Europe … ever since. ''"!# In , writing to his friend Hugh Seton-Watson, who had submitted an article suggesting that it might be desirable that the fairly stable boundaries then attained in Europe should last indefinitely, Armstrong confessed himself disturbed since, ''When you label any German demand for a change irredentism you seem to me to accept the Soviet fait accompli. '' Although he said that his opposition to this outlook sprang from fears that it would encourage subsequent German revisionist demands for revenge upon Russia, equally important seems to have been his concern that, ''If the present regimes are "!" Armstrong to Swing,  Sept. , ibid., box , file Raymond Gram Swing. "!# Armstrong to Raymond J. Sontag,  Sept. , ibid., box , file Raymond J. Sontag.
to be allowed to consolidate themselves within the present boundaries, then what hope is there of bringing freedom to everyone some day ? ''"!$ The writings of the realist Hans J. Morgenthau were likewise profoundly unsympathetic to him, and, despite the fact that Morgenthau was an opponent of the American commitment in Vietnam -albeit for reasons which differed from Armstrong's -he was decidedly unhappy when Morgenthau was awarded a Council fellowship in the mid-s. Indeed, he saw what he believed was Morgenthau's readiness to break the Council seal of confidentiality in discussions as a prime example of the way in which standards of behaviour had degenerated under the stress of Vietnam."!% (One should note, however, that Armstrong was an early admirer and publicist of the writings of both Kennan and Kissinger, both of whom might also be regarded as adherents of the realist tradition, but who perhaps tempered their views with a greater leavening of idealism and moralism -or it may just have been that he found them personally more congenial.) It is perhaps fair to say that Armstrong, although always more a disciple of Wilson than of Roosevelt, represented a fusion of their two approaches, such as could also be found in the policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt."!& One might go further and suggest that Armstrong's own eclectic foreign-policy outlook may have played its part in giving the Council the resilience to weather the storms of fifty years and remain an influential organization throughout that time. Armstrong was always less than worshipful towards his Council's wealthy business sponsors. In , shortly before his retirement, he complained that eight of thirteen nominees for Resident Membership in the Council were bankers, emphasizing : ''The Council began as a merger of two organizations, on the understanding and agreement that the business and non-business elements would be pretty much held in balance, and this has been a feature of the organization which has given it special values. ''"!' Many of its Armstrong deliberately pursued a policy of giving a hearing in the Council to all points of view, but restricting membership to those who were in general sympathy with its prevailing ''internationalist '' outlook.
